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Motivated in part by these concerns, the arms control project of the Center for International
Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology simulated the conduct of American and foreign leaders under conditions of conflict in southern Africa. In this article, I will report on some aspects of CONEX III, as this simulation was called.1 I will leave it largely to the reader to assess the validity of the findings and will furnish materials to enable such assessments.
Questions of validity aside, the study is an important one. It brings to light the options possibly available to the leaders of black Africa for preserving the peace of the continent while advancing the goals of selfdetermination and majority rule.
The interpretations contained in this article are strictly my own and do not reflect the views of the Center, the research director, or any of the other participants in the study. It can be questioned whether Rhodesia would or could afford to play as rational a game as South Africa; that one man played both roles may thus have a bias to uniform rationality.
METHODS OF THE STUDY
Moreover, had the two been played separately, it is doubtful that South Africa could have pressured Rhodesia toward a peaceful settlement as easily as it was able to in the course of our game.
United States Lethargy and Zambia's Reaction
By far the greatest characteristic of the two United States teams was their lack of direction.
Mostly, the teams did nothing. This is not to say that they did not have reasons for their inactivity.
But it is to say that, from Zambia's point of view, in the event of a crisis in southern Africa similar to the one depicted in our game--and assuming the validity of our game--the United States would let the regional conflict run its course without substantial assistance or intervention. Once the request was withdrawn, however, Zambia received all it asked for, with the exception of bombers.
